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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appeal from appellants• conviction for dis-
turbing an assembly. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appel ]ants were tried and convicted in Logan 
City Court for disturbing an assembly and were 
fined $35.00 apiece. They appealed to the District 
Court and were convicted and sentenced to six 
months in jail. From the conviction and denial of 
motions to dismiss and the motion to I imit the 
sentence to that of City Court, appellants appeal. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request the court 
to set aside the conviction on the grounds of a 
denial of free speech. Alternatively, appellants 
request the court to set aside the District 
Court 1s sentence which increased the punishment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 18, 1968, appel !ants attended a 
pub! ic assembly (T 44) on the Utah State University 
Campus sponsored by the so-called T.A.C.T. Committee 
(Truth About Civil Turmoil) (T 18). Appellant 
Emanual Chima, a black student from Biafra attend-
ing Utah State University (T 146), and appellants 
Charles and Pearl Powell, a black couple employed 
at the lntermountain Indian School (Tl24), had not 
met prior to this occasion. They were the only 
blacks in the audience. 
The main attraction of the evening was Julia 
Brown (T 18), who spoke for about an hour (T 20) on 
the civil rights movement which she labeled a com-
munist conspiracy. Perhaps the most offensive 
portions of her speech contained the constantly 
3 
repeated al legation that negroes are foolish dupes 
of the communists (T 126) and that civi 1 rights 
organizations are mere fronts for the party (tape). 
The appellants sat quietly while Julia Brown spoke 
(T 20) , even though they were upset by her accusa-
tions. All the appellants had been active in the 
civi 1 rights movement in the past (T 125). 
When Julia Brown finished speaking, the 
meeting was opened to written questions (T 20). 
At that time Emanual Chima asked to make an oral 
inquiry and was permitted to do so (T 25). He had 
said but a few words when Julia Brown retorted: 
you giving a speech or asking a question? 11 
(T 68). Finally, after explaining that he only 
wanted to make a few prefatory remarks, he managed 
to complete his question (T 68). Rather than 
answer the question, Julia Brown reiterated that 
there was no legitimate civil rights movement in 
this country, and that it was all a communist con-
spiracy (T 68). This caused a mutually sharp verbal 
exchange (T 96). Part of the audience began 
threatening Emanual Chima (T 97). He was surrounded 
4 
by a group of hostile people (T 97). Then Charles 
and Pearl Powell asked Julia Brown to answer the 
question (T 125). Much of the audience began to 
shout back and forth and Julia Brown -- well 
prepared for any contingency and apparently fully 
expecting trouble -- drew a can of Mace from her 
purse (T 80). In spite of Julia Brown's provoca-
tive actions, the meeting returned to order (T 50). 
The first written question was read as 
fo 11 ows: 11How do you know so much more than the 
F.B.l.? 11 (T 50). Julia Brown's reply contained 
the following invitation: II . I want to know 
how you know so much about the F.B. I., and I am 
talking to the person who wrote this question. 11 
(T 51). Charles Powell indicated that he had 
written the question and attempted to respond (T51). 
At this point Julia Brown accused him of being a 
trouble maker who had disrupted her meetings in the 
past (T 51). This was not true. Pearl Powel I came 
to the defense of her husband, and the audience 
began to shout and argue. Once again the Powells 
and Emanual Chima were threatened with physical 
5 
ha rm (T 106, 1 09, 11 0) . Pear 1 Powe 1 1 was hit on 
the head by a woman with a purse (T 110), and 
Charles Powel 1 was pushed by one of the complain-
ants (T 110). 
Julia Brown's speech was of such a provoca-
tive nature as would arouse the emotions and per-
sonal pride of black people (T 135). The appellants, 
in responding to her, were attempting to vindicate 
theirselves and their race before an audience of 
whites (T 134, 135). During the question and 
answer period Julia Brown repeatedly provoked and 
insulted the appellants. For example, she used 
terms 1 i ke 11 b 1 ack trash" (T 75), 11d i sgrace to the 
negro race 11 (T 72), 11communists 11 , 11comrades 11 (T 78), 
which would bring any person to his feet who had 
any personal pride. 
Appellants were tried and convicted in Logan 
City Court and fined $35.00 apiece (record). On 
appeal to the District Court appellants moved to 
set aside the convictions on the grounds of free 
speech (T 6). Appellants also moved for the 
District Court to limit itself, in the event 
6 
appellants were found guilty, to impose no greater 
punishment than that imposed in the City Court (T 7). 
Both motions were denied (T 6, 7). 
Appellants were found guilty by the District 
Court (T 152, 154, 155) and sentenced to serve six 
months in the county jail (T 160). 
ARGUMENTS 
PO INT I 
SECTION 76-52-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERLY BROAD IN 
SCOPE, AND ON ITS FACE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
It is well established that a statute posing 
a threat to freedom of speech and discussion must 
be exact in its language and specifically directed 
towards evils within the permitted area of state 
control. This limitation is required in order to 
prevent curtailment of permitted activities consti-
tuting an exercise of free speech; Thornhill v. 
Alabama 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The power of a state 
to abridge speech is the exception rather than the 
rule. Any restriction must find its justification 
in a reasonable apprehension of danger to the state; 
Herndon v. Lowry 301 U.S. 242 (1937). Moreover, 
7 
the normal presumption of constitutionality of 
statutes is 1 imited in matters related to first 
amendment 1 iberties; United States v. Caroline 
Products 304 U.S. 144 (1938). On the other hand, 
the accused does not have to sustain the burden of 
demonstrating that the statute could not have been 
written in a constitutionally permissable manner; 
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra. 
Section 76-52-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides as follows: 
Every person who, without authority of law, 
wilfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly 
or meeting, not unlawful in its character, 
is guilty of misdemeanor. 
A similar statute to Utah's was reviewed in Cox v. 
Louisiana 379 U.S. 536 (1965). It provides in part 
as follows: 
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of 
the peace, or under circumstances such 
that a breach of the peace may be occasioned 
thereby ... shall be guilty of disturbing 
the peace. 
In Cox, supra, a civil rights leader was convicted 
for taking part in a demonstration with approxi-
mately two thousand negro college students 
8 
protesting racial discrimination. The students 
assembled at the State Capitol building, marched to 
the courthouse, sang songs, prayed, I istened to 
speeches, and failed to disperse on a police order 
that they had exceeded the alloted time for the 
demonstration. The United States Supreme Court 
reversed the decision for infringing on the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments rights of free speech and 
assembly. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the 
majority, found the Louisiana statute overly broad 
in scope and observed that when unpopular opinions 
attract a crowd and necessitate pol ice protection, 
constitutional rights must be protected in the face 
of host ii ity to their assertion or exercise. See 
also Terminiello v. Chicago 337 U.S. I (1949) where 
the court voided a South Carolina statute defining 
criminal offense so as to permit conviction if the 
speech stirred the people to anger, invited public 
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. 
PO I NT 11 
SECTION 76-52-l UTAH CODE ANNOTATED WAS UNCON-
STITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
9 
The legislature did not intend Utah law to 
be used as a device to suppress speech or to 
curtail the open debate and dialogue common to a 
democratic society. One of the functions of free 
speech is to invite dispute. A state may not 
invoke criminal penalties for peaceful expression 
of unpopular views. Free speech may best serve 
its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger. It may 
in fact provoke social change by striking at preju-
dices and misconceptions. For this reason speech 
is protected from unwarranted censorship or pun-
ishment; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra. 
In Edwards v. South Carolina 372 U.S. 229 
(1963) the United States Supreme Court reversed 
convictions of negroes charged with the breach of 
the peace by finding a constitutionally protected 
right of free speech. The defendants, who had 
peaceably assembled at the State House to express 
their grievances, were arrested after failing to 
obey a pol ice order to disperse. 
IO 
At page 702, the court said: 
We do not review in this case criminal con-
victions resulting from the evenhanded 
application of a precise and narrowly drawn 
regulatory statute evincing a legislative 
judgment that certain specific conduct be 
I imited or proscribed. If, for example, 
the petitioners had been convicted upon 
evidence that they had violated a Jaw 
regulating traffic, or had disobeyed a Jaw 
reasonably I imiting the periods during which 
the State House grounds were open to the 
pub! ic, this would be a different case. 
[citations omitted]. These petitioners were 
convicted of an offense so generalized as to 
be, in the words of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court, 11 not susceptible of exact 
definition. 11 And they were convicted upon 
evidence which showed no more than that the 
opinions which they were peaceably expres-
sing were sufficiently opposed to the views 
of the majority of the community to attract 
a crowd and necessitate pol ice protection.'' 
PO I NT 111 
BY INCREASING THE CITY COURT'S SENTENCE OF 
EACH DEFENDANT FROM A $35.00 FINE TO SIX MONTHS IN 
JAIL, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
When a person convicted in City Court is 
compelled to risk imposition of a greater sentence 
by the District Court on trial de novo, a violation 
occurs; Patton v. State of North Carolina 381 F.2d 
636 (1967). The Jaw does not confront one with 
"grisly choice 11 of either abandoning his search for 
11 
legal redress or pursuing that right under the 
hazard of increased punishment; v. Noie 372 U.S. 
391 (1963). Moreover, the defendant does not waive 
this protection; Green v. United States 355 U.S. 
184 (1957). The presumption of injury is irrebut-
able; Marano v. United States 374 F.2d 583 (1967); 
Patton, supra. 
POINT IV 
BY INCREASING THE CITY COURT'S SENTENCE OF 
EACH DEFENDANT FROM A $35.00 FINE TO SIX MONTHS IN 
JAIL, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTEC-
TION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
In Patton, supra, Justice Sobeloff of the 
Fourth Circuit said at page 641: 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 1 ikewise compels a rule barring a 
sentence in excess of the one invalidated and 
this protection extends even to one seeking 
to avail himself of a state's post conviction 
remedies because of nonconstitutional errors 
1n the original trial. 
Anyone choosing not to appeal a conviction is 
protected from an increased sentence once they com-
mence to serve their term. Thus, the threat of 
heavier punishment falls solely on those who 
utilize post conviction remedies. This is an 
12 
arbitrary classification offensive to the equal 
protection clause, Patton, supra. 
POINT V 
BY INCREASING THE CITY COURT'S SENTENCE OF 
EACH DEFENDANT FROM A $35.00 FINE TO SIX MONTHS IN 
JAIL, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
As indicated before, many cases hold that a 
sentence cannot be increased once service has com-
menced; United States v. Benz 282 U.S. 304 (1931); 
United States v. Sacco 367 F.2d 368 (1966); United 
States v. Adams 362 F.2d 210 (1966); Kennedy v. 
United States 330 F.2d 26 (1964). 
These decisions are not meaningfully dist in-
guishable from this case and, consequently, harsher 
punishment after a trial de novo violates the 
defendant's constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy, Patton, supra. See also Green, supra, 
where the United States Supreme Court held that an 
accused cannot be retried for first degree murder 
following his successful appeal from his conviction 
of second degree murder on the theory that the jury 




The defendants• convictions must be set aside 
because of their constitutionally protected rights 
of free speech and because of violations of due 
process, equal protection, and double jeopardy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
203 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
